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Private Diplomacy and Public Business: Public
Supervision of the Communications Satellite
Corporation
The Communications Satellite Act of 19621 authorizes the crea-
tion of the Communications Satellite Corporation (Comsat) and
vests it with responsibility for developing a program for global satel-
lite communications. Comsat is a private business organized for
profit2 and is financed entirely by commercial loans and the sale of
capital stock.3 The corporation receives no federal grants and cannot
invoke the authority of the United States in support of its actions.4
The decision to use a wholly private corporation as the instru-
ment for satellite system development was in keeping with the tra-
dition of relying on the private sector for telecommunications facili-
ties.5 The overall aim of the 1962 Act, however, was not solely to
promote commercial opportunities. The Act also declares that the
satellite system shall be responsive "to public needs and . . . con-
tribute to world peace and understanding."' Accordingly, the Act
involves the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and the
executive branch in the public supervision of Comsat.7
This comment examines the statutory accommodation of the
functions of Comsat, the FCC, and the Executive, focusing particu-
larly upon the extent of executive branch power to supervise Com-
sat's international activities. Its thesis is that the Executive has
exceeded its supervisory powers by dictating Comsat's position on
I Pub. L. No. 87-624, 76 Stat. 419 (1962) (codified, with amendments, at 47 U.S.C. §§
701-744 (1970)) [hereinafter cited without cross reference as Satellite Act].
2 Satellite Act § 301, 47 U.S.C. § 731 (1970).
3 See Satellite Act § 304, 47 U.S.C. § 734 (1970). The 1962 Act provides for up to 50%
participation in common equity by carriers authorized to invest in Comsat by the FCC.
Satellite Act § 304(b)(1), (2), 47 U.S.C. § 734(b)(1), (2) (1970). The remaining common shares
are available for subscription by the general public. Satellite Act § 304(a), 47 U.S.C. § 734(a)
(1970). Comsat is also authorized to issue nonvoting securities and debentures. Satellite Act
§ 304(c), 47 U.S.C. § 734(c) (1970).
Compare Satellite Act § 301, 47 U.S.C. § 731 (1970), with 16 U.S.C. § 831c(h), (k)
(1970) (authorizing the Tennessee Valley Authority to act "in the name of the United
States").
5 President Kennedy stated in his message to Congress on the bill to create Comsat:
"Throughout our history this country's national communication systems have been privately
owned and operated, subject to governmental regulation of rates and service. In the case of
the communications satellite operation ... the national objectives ... can best be achieved
in the framework of a privately owned corportion ..... Letter to Lyndon Johnson (Feb. 7,
1962), reprinted in [1962] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2288-90.
1 Satellite Act § 102(a), 47 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1970).
7 Id. § 201, 47 U.S.C. § 721 (1970).
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technical and operational matters arising in the course .of Comsat's
activity within INTELSAT, the international organization estab-
lished in 1964 to own and operate the global satellite system.8
I. CURRENT EXECUTIVE BRANCH SUPERVISION OF COMSAT'S
INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITIES
The executive branch currently exercises supervisory authority
over Comsat's international activities in three principal ways: (1)
negotiation with foreign governments of international agreements
regarding satellite systems; (2) participation in the INTELSAT
Assembly of Parties; and (3) instruction of Comsat on the positions
it should take concerning matters coming before the INTELSAT
Board of Governors.
The Department of State's role in the negotiation of the interim
and definitive INTELSAT agreements illustrates the Executive's
exercise of supervisory authority through negotiation of interna-
tional agreements. Initial negotiations regarding the establishment
of a global communications satellite system were handled by the
State Department and resulted, in 1964, in the signing of executive
agreements that created an interim INTELSAT consortium. The
INTELSAT consortium was governed by an intergovernmental
agreement formally associating nations in their sovereign capacity."°
Comsat was named manager in the design, development, construc-
tion, operation, and maintenance of the space segment."1 Ownership
in the system and voting power in the governing body, the Interim
Communications Satellite Committee (ICSC), were based on traffic
forecasts for 1968.12 Comsat received an initial investment quota
and vote of sixty-one percent,13 nearly twice the voting power of the
I INTELSAT is the acronym for the International Telecommunications Satellite Organi-
zation. The Organization was established by agreements for the International Telecommuni-
cations Satellite Organization (INTELSAT), entered into force Feb. 12, 1973, [hereinafter
cited as INTELSAT Definitive Agreement] [1972] 23 U.S.T. 3813, T.I.A.S. No. 7532, -
U.N.T.S. _. These agreements supersede the agreements for an interim INTELSAT Con-
sortium, Communications Satellite System, entered into force August 20, 1964, [hereinafter
cited as INTELSAT Interim Agreement] [1964] 15 U.S.T. 1705, T.I.A.S. No. 5646, 514
U.N.T.S. 25.
See text and notes at notes 162-167 infra.
o INTELSAT Interim Agreement, supra note 8, Art. XII(a), (b), [1964] 15 U.S.T. 1705,
1717-18, T.I.A.S. No. 5646, 514 U.N.T.S. 25, 40. Sovereign authorities did not at first partici-
pate directly in the management of the interim organization; instead, communications agen-
cies, rather than their sponsoring governments, were responsible for the obligations of mem-
bership. Id. Art. 11, [1964115 U.S.T. at 1707-08, T.I.A.S. No. 5646, 514 U.N.T.S. 25, 28.
Id. Art. VIII [1964115 U.S.T. at 1713, T.I.A.S. No. 5646, 514 U.N.T.S. 2, 36.
" D. SMITH, COMMUNICATION VIA SATELLITE 138 (1976).
' See INTELSAT Interim Agreement, supra note 8, Special Agreement, [1964] Annex,
15 U.S.T. at 1778, T.I.A.S. No. 5646, 514 U.N.T.S. at 68.
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entities representing all the European nations."
The interim consortium agreement expressly provided that de-
finitive arrangements for the governance of the satellite system
would be considered by 1969.' In the meantime, it became increas-
ingly evident that the consortium structure inadequately repre-
sented the variety of interests within INTELSAT," and in 1969 a
plenipotentiary conference was convened in Washington to deter-
mine the future governance of INTELSAT systems. 17 The State
Department again handie&dthe negotiations on behalf of the United
States. After two years of negotiations, a new agreement was
reached."
In general, the definitive agreement was designed to prevent
any single interest or group of nations from exercising dominant
influence over INTELSAT affairs. 9 The institutional arrangements
replaced the ICSC with a Board of Governors, °2 which was given
responsibility for handling the business of the organization.2' The
Board is composed of telecommunications agency representatives
whose vote is weighted according to relative investment.2 1 Voting
rights on the Board are not fully correlated with investment partici-
pation, however, as had been the case in the ICSC; rather, a forty
percent ceiling was placed on Comsat's voting power.23 Further-
more, because Comsat's management role had been so irksome to
the Europeans,21 the definitive arrangements established an inter-
national administrative organ that would gradually absorb the
management functions previously performed by Comsat.
21
" See id.
,5 Id. Art. IX, [1964] 15 U.S.T. at 1713-14, T.I.A.S. No. 5646, 514 U.N.T.S. at 36, 38.
See Levy, INTELSAT: Technology, Politics and the Transformation of a Regime, 29
INT'L ORGANIZATION 655, 667-76 (1975). INTELSAT's membership had increased from 19 to
83 members, many of whom were underdeveloped states with a low level of investment and
consequently little voice in management.
'T INTELSAT Conference Opens at Washington, 60 DEP'T STATE BULL. 231 (1969).
, Doyle, The Permanent Charter for INTELSAT, 65 DEP'T STATE BULL. 415 (1971).
" Levy, supra note 16, at 668-700.
See INTELSAT Definitive Agreement, supra note 8, Arts. IX, X, [1972] 23 U.S.T.
at 3832-45, T.I.A.S. No. 7532, - U.N.T.S. _.
21 Id., Art. X(a), [1972] 23 U.S.T. at 3840-44, T.I.A.S. No. 7532, - U.N.T.S. -.
' Id., Art. IX(a)(i), (ii), [1972] 23 U.S.T. at 3832, T.I.A.S. No. 7532, - U.N.T.S.
See id., Art. IV(g)(iv), [1972] 23 U.S.T. at 3838, T.I.A.S. No. 7532, - U.N.T.S.
-. Also, the new arrangements insured that the Board of Governors would reflect a wide
geographic base, by reserving five positions for representatives selected on a basis other than
investment shares. Id., Art. IX (a)(iii), [1972] 23 U.S.T. at 3832, T.I.A.S. No. 7532,
U.N.T.S. _.
21 A particular source of complaint was Comsat's unwillingness to promote the distribu-
tion of procurement contracts among the European nations. See Comsat Fights for a Job, Bus.
WEEK, March 3, 1961, at 60-61.
The INTELSAT agreements provided that for an initial period of six years after the
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In addition to forming the Board of Governors, the INTELSAT
definitive agreement organized an Assembly of Parties. The Assem-
bly's jurisdiction extends to "those aspects of INTELSAT which are
primarily of interest to the Parties as sovereign States. ' 2 The As-
sembly is composed of diplomatic representatives of all INTELSAT
members, and each member is entitled to one vote.27 The Depart-
ment of State's representation of the United States in the Assembly,
which functions as a political check on the actions of the INTEL-
SAT Board of Governors, constitutes the second mode of executive
branch supervision of Comsat. The Assembly generally considers
issues of diplomatic concern to the member states-matters such as
the formal relations of the organization with states and other inter-
national organizations, the long term goals of the organization, and
the applicability of various treaties to which member countries are
party.2s
However, because the United States has only one vote in the
Assembly of Parties and the weighted voting system affords Comsat
approximately one-third of the Board of Governors vote, 29 the Exec-
utive as a practical matter can best further its foreign policy inter-
ests by influencing the position taken by Comsat on those matters
which come before the Board. Since 1966 such control has been
exercised pursuant to the terms of a joint Department of State-
Office of Telecommunications Policy-Federal Communications
Commission memorandum entitled "Procedures for U.S. Instruc-
tion of the Communications Satellite Corporation in its Role as U.S.
Representative to the Interim Communications Satellite Commit-
tee. '3° This instruction procedure is the third, and most controver-
definitive arrangements, Comsat would perform management functions under contract to
INTELSAT. See INTELSAT Definitive Argeement, supra note 8, Art. XII(e), [1972] 23
U.S.T. at 3849, T.I.A.S. No. 7532, - U.N.T.S. -.
21 Id., Art. VII(b), [1972) 23 U.S.T. at 3824-25, T.I.A.S. No. 7532, - U.N.T.S.
See id., Art. VII(a), (b), (f), [1972] 23 U.S.T. 3824-25, 3827, T.I.A.S. No. 7532, -
U.N.T.S. _. Other universal membership bodies in which each member had a single vote
were also established. A meeting of Signatories was established to deal with matters of the
budgetary requirements of the organization and the operational characteristics of the system.
Id., Art. VIII [1972] 23 U.S.T. at 3828-30, T.I.A.S. No. 7532, - U.N.T.S. -.
29 Id., Art. VII(c)(i),(ii)ix), [1972] 23 U.S.T. at 3825-26, T.I.A.S. No. 7532,
U.N.T.S. _.
" See In re Communications Satellite Corp., 56 F.C.C.2d 1101, 1157 (1975), remanded
on other grounds, No. 75-2193 (D.C. Cir., Oct. 14, 1977).
(August, 1966), reprinted in REPORT OF THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED
STATES, REsPONSIBILITIES, AcTiONS, AND COORDINATION OF FEDERAL AGENcIES IN INTERNATIONAL
TELEcOMMUNICATIONS SERvIcES 79-81 (1977) [hereinafter cited as COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S
REPORT]. The Office of Telecommunications Policy is scheduled for abolishment in April,
1978. Its responsibilities concerning the global satellite system will be transferred to the
Department of Commerce. See Reorg. Plan No. I of 1977, 42 Fed. Reg. 56101, 56102 (1977).
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sial,3 ' of the means the Executive has employed to supervise the
international affairs of the corporation. The procedure requires
Comsat to advise the appropriate agencies, at least four weeks in
advance, of the proposed agenda for INTELSAT Board of Governors
meetings.3 Each agency then reviews the agenda and advises the
State Department on those matters which the agency believes re-
quire prior instructions to Comsat. Comsat is obligated under the
memorandum to take no action on agenda items singled out for
attention by the various agencies until it receives State Department
instructions. These instructions set forth the positions that Comsat
"should take on the agenda items which require United States Gov-
ernment instructions" 33 and are intended to be binding.34
The propriety of these three modes of executive supervision
must be determined under domestic law. Indeed, the INTELSAT
Definitive Agreement provides that "relations between any telecom-
munications entity, acting as Signatory, and the Party which desig-
nated it shall be governed by applicable domestic law."35 The next
section of this comment examines the limits domestic law places on
executive authority to supervise Comsat.
II. THE LIMITS OF EXEcUTiVE AuTHORITY OVER COMSAT
A. Executive Supervision of Comsat's International Business
Activities: Sections 201(a)(4) and 402
Sections 201(a)(4) and 402 are the principal provisions of the
1962 Act governing the scope of the Executive's role respecting Com-
sat's relationships with foreign governments and international or
-1 Comsat officials have refused to acknowledge that the instructions are binding, refer-
ring to them instead as providing mere "guidance." See Letter from James McCormack,
Chairman, Communications Satellite Corporation, to Frank E. Loy, Department of State
(Aug. 27, 1966), reprinted in Government Use of Satellite Communications, Hearings before
a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 406
(1966) [hereinafter cited as Government Use Hearings]. The State Department has claimed
that the instruction procedure does not interfere with Comsat's corporate responsibilities, see
Letter from Frank E. Loy to James J. McCornack (Aug. 18, 1966), reprinted in Government
Use Hearings, supra, at 406, but the corporation feels that State Department instructions do
interfere. See In re Communications Satellite Corp., 56 F.C.C.2d 1101, 1156-57 (1975)
remanded, No. 75-2193 (D.C. Cir., Oct. 14, 1977). The FCC and Department of State have
also had disagreements over their respective authorities under the 1962 Act. See CoMPTRoLLER
GENERAL'S REPor, supra note 30, at 54.
22 CoMPTRoLLER GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 30, at 79.
" Id. at 81.
' Letter from Frank E. Loy to James J. McCormack, (Aug. 18, 1966), reprinted in
Government Use Hearings, supra note 31 at 407. See CoPmTRoLLER GENEAL's REPORT, supra
note 30, at 79-81.
15 INTELSAT Definitive Agreement, supra note 8, Art. I (b), [1972] 23 U.S.T. at 3818,
T.I.A.S. No. 7532, - U.N.T.S. -.
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foreign entities.36 Section 402 appears to limit the role of the State
Department in Comsat's business negotiations concerning
"facilities, operations, and services" to "advi[sing] the corporation
of relevant foreign policy considerations. ' 7 Section 201(a) (4), on the
other hand, provides that the President shall "exercise such supervi-
sion over relationships of the corporation with foreign governments
or entities or international bodies as may be appropriate to assure
that such relationships shall be consistent with the national interest
and foreign policy of the United States, '38 and thus appears to grant
the President plenary authority to supervise Comsat's international
16 Satellite Act §§ 201(a)(4), 402, 47 U.S.C. § 721(a)(4), 742 (1970). Other sections of
the 1962 Act further delineate aspects of the Executive/Comsat relationship. Section
201(a) (5) is particularly important in the area of Comsat's relationships with foreign govern-
ments. It provides that the President shall "insure that timely arrangements are made under
which there can be foreign participation in the establishment and use of a communications
satellite system." Satellite Act § 201(a)(5), 47 U.S.C. § 721(a)(5) (1970). Because there is
little or no tension between the grant of this authority and the restriction of the State
Department's role in Comsat's business negotiations in section 402 of the Act, see text and
notes at notes 102-110 infra, section 201(a)(5) will not be discussed further in this section of
the comment.
Satellite Act § 201(c)(3), 47 U.S.C. § 721(c)(3) (1970), which provides that upon the
determination of the Secretary of State that communication should be established to a
particular foreign point, the FCC shall institute proceedings under 214(d) of the Communica-
tions Act of 1934 "to require the establishment of such communication," and § 201(a)(3), 47
U.S.C. § 721(a)(3) (1970), which authorizes the President to "coordinate the activities of
governmental agencies with responsibilities in the field of telecommunication," will be dis-
cussed in this part of this comment.
Finally, the President has some direct contact with Comsat's internal affairs. He has the
power, subject to the approval of the Senate, to appoint three of the fifteen members of the
company's board of directors. Satellite Act § 303, 47 U.S.C. § 733 (1970). However, the
Attorney General concluded in 1962 that these appointees are neither government officials
nor agents of the President. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 11 (1962). As directors their principal obliga-
tion is to the corporation and its shareholders, see Schwartz, Governmentally Appointed
Directors in a Private Corporation-The Communications Satellite Act of 1962, 79 HARv. L.
Rav. 350, 361-63 (1965). Comsat's articles of incorporation provide that all classes of directors
have the same fiduciary duty. Articles of Incorporation of Communications Satellite Corp.,
Art. VIII, § 8.04, reprinted in Nominations of the Incorporators of the Communication Satel-
lite Corporation, Hearings before the Senate Comm. on Aeronautical and Space Sciences,
88th Cong., 1st. Sess. 49 (1963). Presidential appointment was provided for primarily to
prevent domination of Comsat by the communications common carriers, principally AT&T.
See Schwartz, supra, at 353; S. RaP. No. 1584, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 11, reprinted in [1962]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2269, 2272.
3' Satellite Act § 402, 47 U.S.C. § 742'(1970). Section 402 provides:
Whenever the corporation shall enter into business negotiations with respect to
facilities, operations, or services authorized by this chapter with any international or
foreign entity, it shall notify the Department of State of the negotiations, and the
Department of State shall advise the corporation of relevant foreign policy considera-
tions. Throughout such negotiations the corporation shall keep the Department of State
informed with respect to such considerations. The corporation may request the Depart-
ment of State to assist in the negotiations, and that Department shall render such
assistance as may be appropriate.
38 Id., § 201, 47 U.S.C. § 721(a)(4).
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relationships without distinguishing commercial relationships that
arise in the ordinary course of business. That the scope of Presiden-
tial authority under section 201(a)(4) may be limited, however, is
suggested by the use of the term "supervision," as opposed to some
more specific term such as "guidance" or "control." More impor-
tant, the legislative history of the 1962 Act suggests that Congress
did not view section 201(a)(4) as an all-inclusive delegation of au-
thority to the President to regulate the dealings of the corporation
in foreign commerce. Although it has been stated that "in a statute
dealing with foreign affairs, a grant to the President which is expan-
sive to the reader's eye should not be hemmed in or 'cabined,
cribbed, confined' by anxious judical blinders, '3 9 courts have often
resorted to legislative history in order to determine the scope of
delegated authority even in the face of broad statutory language."
Sections 201(a)(4) and 402 as eventually enacted differ signifi-
cantly from the comparable provisions in the original Administra-
tion bill.4 1 The original version of section 201(a)(4) stated that the
President shall "exercise general supervision over relationships of
the corporation with foreign governments or entities or with interna-
tional bodies" ;42 the Administration's proposed section 402 provided
that Comsat "shall not enter into negotiations with any interna-
tional agency, foreign government, or entity without a prior notifica-
tion to the Department of State, which will conduct or supervise
such negotiations," and that "all agreements and arrangements
with any such agency, government, or entity shall be subject to the
1' South Puerto Rico Sugar Co. Trading Corp. v. United States, 334 F.2d 622, 632 (Ct.
Cl.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 964 (1964).
" [W]hen Congress uses far-reaching words in delegating authority to the Presi-
dent in the area of foreign affairs, courts must assume, unless there is a specific contrary
showing elsewhere in the statute or in the legislative history, that the legislators contem-
plate that the President may and will make full use of that power in any manner not
inconsistent with the provisions or purposes of the Act.
Id. (emphasis added). See Algonquin SNG, Inc. v. Federal Energy Admin., 518 F.2d 1051
(D.C. Cir. 1975), rev'd on a contrary reading of the legislative history, 426 U.S. 548 (1976);
United States v. Yoshida International, Inc., 526 F.2d 560 (C.C.P.A. 1975).
"1 The Administration's proposal was simultaneously introduced in the House and Sen-
ate. S. REP. No. 1584, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprinted in [1962] U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD.
NEws 2269, 2270. The bills were S. 2814, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in Hearings on S.
2650 & 2814 before the Senate Comm. on Aeronautical & Space Sciences, 87th Cong., 2d Sess.
5 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Space Sciences Hearings]; H.R. 10138, 87th Cong. 2d Sess.,
reprinted in Hearings on H.R. 10115 & 10138 before the House Comm. on Interstate & Foreign
Commerce, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 351 (1962) [hereinafter cited as House Commerce
Hearings]; H.R. 10115, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in House Commerce Hearings, supra,
at 345. All three bills are identical; reference will be made to S. 2814.
,2 S. 2814, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. § 201(a)(4), reprinted in Space Sciences Hearings, supra
note 41, at 6.
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approval of the Department of State."4 3 The Administration propos-
als as to the President's supervisory authority were amended to
substantially their present form by the Senate Committee on Aero-
nautical and Space Sciences.4 4 After the Senate Committee on
Aeronautical and Space Sciences reported its version of the legis-
lation, a bill 5 containing identical provisions4 was introduced into
the House by Representative Oren Harris, chairman of the House
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. This bill was
referred to his House Commerce Committee, which was already
considering the Administration proposal.48 This Committee re-
ported out the legislation without altering the Senate Committee's
versions of what were to become sections 201(a)(4) and 402 of the
1962 Act.49
The purpose of amending sections 201(a) (4) and 402 was appar-
ently to redefine the role of the Executive in the regulation of Com-
sat. Both committees heard much testimony concerning the desir-
able scope of Executive authority, both from Administration wit-
nesses and from representatives of private enterprise. In particular,
the testimony was replete with reference to existing practice with
respect to Executive involvement in the business affairs of the inter-
national communications carriers (principally AT&T and ITT)."
This testimony established that the international carriers usually
notified the State Department when they negotiated with foreign
governments but that the State Department's role in the negotia-
tions had been quite limited. A vice-president of AT&T testified
that the State Department had been "helpful in one phase or the
other" in the negotiation of "a few" of AT&T's international agree-
ments, usually at the request of the corporation, 51 and the State
' S. 2814, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. § 402, reprinted in Space Sciences Hearings, supra note
41, at 10.
" The Senate Aeronautical and Space Sciences Committee's changes are discussed in
S. REP. No. 1319, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, at 8-9 (1962). The text of S. 2814, as amended by
the Senate Space Sciences Committee, is reprinted in Communications Satellite Legislation:
Hearings before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1962) [hereinafter
cited as Senate Commerce Hearings].
'0 H.R. 11040, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 108 CONG. RF. 5611 (1962).
4 H.R. REP. No. 1636, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1962). The numbering of H.R. 11040
differed from the numbering of S. 2814.
a Id.
4' Id.
' Compare S. 2814, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 403(a)(4) & 410 (1962), as amended by the
Senate Committee on Aeronautical & Space Sciences, reprinted in Senate Commerce Hear-
ings, supra note 44, at 5, 10, with H.R. 11040, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 201(a)(4) & 402 (1962),
in H.R. REP. No. 1636, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, 6 (1962).
- See, e.g., House Commerce Hearings, supra note 41, at 393-94, 457-58, 460, 463-64, 503-
04, 531, 550, 578 (1962); Space Sciences Hearings, supra note 41, at 158-59, 165, 172, 176, 178,
190, 270, 322, 445 (1962).
51 House Commerce Hearings, supra note 41, at 550.
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Department could point to only three telecommunications agree-
ments for which it conducted the "overall" negotiations.2 Such tes-
timony was usually elicited by committee members who were dis-
tressed by the broad grant of authority to the State Department in
section 402 of the Administration bill.53
The evident opposition to strict State Department control over
Comsat prompted disclaimers of any such intent by the bill's advo-
cates. Conceding that the past practice of limited Executive in-
volvement in the global affairs of the international carriers had
generally worked out satisfactorily,54 the State Department spokes-
man, Under Secretary of State of Political Affairs George McGhee,
reassured the House Commerce Committee that the State Depart-
ment's interest would be limited to "establishing the basic relation-
ship between [a]. . . country and the international net .... We
would merely be inhibiting and blocking [Comsat] in carrying out
its functions if we insisted on negotiating every agreement as to
rates and frequencies and all the commercial factors. 5 5 Before the
Senate Aeronautical and Space Sciences Committee, McGhee
stated: "The State Department will in no sense be a regulatory body
corresponding to that of the FCC. The State Department would . .
facilitate and supervise those negotiations which involve important
foreign policy relations between us and the other government
"56
Mere assurances that State would be restrained in the exercise
of its authority, however, did not placate the opponents of broad
State Department power over the corporation's international deal-
ings. In the Senate Aeronautical and Space Sciences hearings Sena-
tor Cannon suggested an amendment to section 402 substantially
similar to that eventually approved. 7 McGhee admitted that "your
language corresponds quite closely to the present relationship
[between the Executive and the international carriers]," though he
protested that "a new situation would be created here which would
mean that our Government must get into negotiations."58 Several
11 Id. at 446; Space Sciences Hearings, supra note 41, at 172.
See, e.g., House Commerce Hearings, supra note 41, at 393 (Rep. Dominick), 421 (Rep.
Younger), 431 (Rep. Thomson), 491 (Rep. Curtin), 501-04 (Rep. Harris); Space Sciences
Hearings, supra note 41, at 169, 176-77 (Sen. Kerr), 191 (Sen. Case). Also, a number of
congressmen were frankly antagonistic to the Department of State. See, e.g., House Com-
merce Hearings, supra note 41, at 423 (Rep. Hemphill), 426 (Rep. Devine). See also Space
Sciences Hearings, supra note 41, at 170-72, 175-78 (Sen. Kerr).
m House Commerce Hearings, supra note 41, at 457-58.
Id. at 476.
Space Sciences Hearings, supra note 41, at 164-65.
' Id. at 190.
5Id.
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days later the Administration evidently decided to take a somewhat
different tack and to accede to congressional pressure for a different
arrangement.
Attorney General Robert Kennedy revealed the Administra-
tion's apparent change of heart in the final days of the House Com-
merce Committee hearings. Pressed to explain the meaning of, and
the need for, the broad grant of Executive power in the Administra-
tion's proposed section 402, Kennedy conceded that the language
was "stronger than it has to be." 9 The Administration, he said, did
not intend the statute to deviate from the ordinary Executive-
common carrier relationship, a relationship which generally "has
worked very well."60 Rather, the concern was that the Act might be
construed to deprive the Executive of the authority to undertake
major negotiations with foreign governments. Kennedy emphasized
that the satellite corporation was qualitatively different from exist-
ing common carriers and that "a lot of this will have to take place
between the governments."" The primary purpose of section 402
was to provide a channel for communications:
We have to make sure that if this Corporation got into
existence and wanted to make some arrangements with a coun-
try that would be against our foreign policy to make such ar-
rangements, that the State Department was informed; the
President was kept informed.
I think that was the only purpose of section 402, which I
think is a necessary laudable purpose, but I think that the
language can be altered, and we would be delighted to work
with this committee to try to work out mutually acceptable
language.62
Section 402 was amended shortly thereafter by the Senate
Aeronautical and Space Sciences Committee" and the House Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce Committee concurred. 4 Rejecting a
compromise amendment offered by FCC Chairman Newton Minow,
which would have required State Department approval of Comsat's
arrangements with foreign agencies to the extent such arrangements
affected United States foreign policy, 5 the committees instead
largely wrote into the legislation existing practice regarding Execu-
5, House Commerce Hearings, supra note 41, at 578.
0Id.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 580.
See text and notes at notes 43-44 supra.
See text and notes at notes 45-49 supra.
" Space Sciences Hearings, supra note 41, at 471.
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tive branch involvement in the global business activities of the in-
ternational carriers. The amended section imposed a legal require-
ment that Comsat notify the State Department of any business
negotiations between Comsat and foreign governments or entities,
and directed the State Department to advise the corporation of
"relevant foreign policy considerations" with respect to such nego-
tiations. The bills also provided that, upon the request of the Corpo-
ration, the State Department is to render "appropriate" assistance
in the negotiations." The Senate Space Sciences Committee ex-
plained: "In summary, the proposed section [402] reflects the prac-
tices now followed in regard to business negotiations which commu-
nications carriers conduct with international and foreign entities."67
The committees did not intend the amendment of the proposed
section 402 to change "the responsibility of the President, and
through him of the Department of State, for the conduct of foreign
relations."" In apparent response to the plea of Attorney General
Kennedy "to recognize the interest of the Government," 9 the pro-
posed language of section 201(a) (4) was amended to provide that the
President "shall exercise such general supervision over relationships
of the corporation with foreign governments as may be appropriate
to assure that such relationships shall be consistent with the na-
tional interest and foreign policy of the United States. 70 The report
of neither committee commented on the purpose or intended effect
of this revision. However, given the declared purpose of curtailing
the State Department's role in the Corporation's business negotia-
tions through the amendment of section 402 and the recognition
that, in the field of foreign affairs, the President acts by and through
the Department of State, 71 it cannot have been intended simply to
transfer to the President the substantive authority that the Admin-
istration's bill would have reposed in the State Department. In-
deed, a floor amendment offered in the House by Representative
Celler that would have accomplished substantially that, by author-
izing the President to "disapprove all acts or actions, both by the
" S. 2814, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. § 410 (1962), as amended, reprinted in Senate Commerce
Hearings, supra note 44, at 10; H.R. 11040, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. § 402 (1962), in H.R. REP.
No. 1636, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1962).
S. REp. No. 1319, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1962).
U Id.
' See text and note at note 59 supra.
7' S. 2814, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. § 403(a)(4) (1962), as amended, reprinted in Senate
Commerce Hearings, supra note 44, at 5 (italicization not in original; italicized language
added by amendment discussed in text). See also text and notes at notes 44-49 supra.
71 See text and note at note 68 supra; House Commerce Hearings, supra note 41, at 442,
461, 485, 580; Space Sciences Hearings, supra note 41, at 155, 165.
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corporation and by departments and agencies of the Government,
whenever necessary, to attain full compliance with the national
policy regarding communications through space satellites," was
defeated by voice vote.71
Considered in conjunction with the concurrent amendment to
section 402, it seems clear that the purpose of the section 201(a)(4)
amendment was not to grant the President plenary authority to
control the corporation in its international business activity.
Rather, the amendment accords legislative recognition to the Exec-
utive's traditional role in the conduct of foreign relations. In hear-
ings before both committees Administration spokesmen emphasized
that the establishment of an international communications satellite
system would implicate the interests and necessarily involve the
-cooperation of many sovereign countries, that the arrangements
would therefore have to be negotiated on a diplomatic level between
the interested governments, and that one of the principal goals of
the Administration's proposed bill was to ensure that such negotia-
tions would be conducted by the President's representative in for-
eign affairs, the Department of State. 3 Negotiations between gov-
108 CONG. REc. 7709 (1962).
13 See, e.g., House Commerce Hearings, supra note 41, at 476, 486, 584, 592; Space
Sciences Hearings, supra note 41, at 158-59, 165, 169, 171, 180, 192. Remarks of Under
Secretary of State McGhee in the Senate Space Sciences Hearings are representative:
SENATOR ANDERSON..
What part does the State Department now play in negotiations made by present
communications carriers with foreign countries?
MR. McGHEE. Senator, in most cases the actual negotiation would be conducted
by the carrier. In many instances the Department or its representatives abroad would
facilitate the negotiation, would set the stage by discussions with the foreign government
or entity involved, and would assist in every way possible. But the burden of the negotia-
tion would be conduct by the carrier.
We envisage that under the proposed bill this would actually be the case, where
purely commercial or technical considerations were involved or where relatively routine
negotiatons were involved. But the present negotiations largely involve point-to-point
or country-to-country facilities. We are speaking here of facilities which encompass large
segments of the earth, and many countries, and in quite new situations.
So it would be necessary, in many cases, for the Department to break the ground
by first negotiating a general agreement pursuant to which the Corporation could negoti-
ate, or to sit with the Corporation to negotiate, to supervise, to see that the foreign
policies of the United States were achieved and that the Corporation was facilitated in
the accomplishment of its objectives.
Space Sciences Hearings, supra note 41, at 158.
What is envisaged here is a system which, at one time, covers most of the globe,
which involves novel means of communications and novel arrangements, which involves
foreign policy objectives of our country with respect to developing nations and with
respect to many of our allies and friends in the world. This program involves the foreign
relations of the United States which are the responsibility of the President. The Depart-
ment of State acts as his representative in dealing with these problems.
Id. at 165.
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ernments, which would, for example, establish "the basic relation-
ship between [a] .. .country and the international net," have
traditionally been the responsibility of the President. When section
201(a) (4) is viewed as a recognition of that fact, it appears that the
bill as reported out of the House Commerce and Senate Space Sci-
ences Committees established a division between public and private
responsibility for the international aspects of the corporation's func-
tions: those aspects of a diplomatic nature, involving the relations
of the United States with foreign nations, would be the affair of the
President; on the other hand, those of a business nature, involving
"facilities, operations and service," would be the affairs of the cor-
poration, subject only to FCC regulation and, where appropriate,
State Department advice.
The attempts to reconcile what appeared to some as the con-
flicting directives of sections 201(a)(4) and 402 in hearings held by
the Senate Commerce Committee in April of 1962 affirm this view
of the bill's division of responsibility. An FCC spokesman testified
that the bill only limited the State Department's role with respect
to Comsat's business negotiations, while allowing the Executive
branch to determine policy in the context of diplomatic decisions:
Now, under [section 201(a)(4)] there is reserved the right
of the President and Department of State to do the real policy
matters with respect to the use of the satellite.
There will be multilateral negotiations, with respect to
frequency negotiations, . . . with respect to the technical para-
meters, and ... with respect to the rights of each country for
the use of it.
I don't think that this [section 402] precludes the State
Department from doing its legitimate function. I think it just
indicates that the ordinary day-to-day business negotiations
which are done now by common carriers with other govern-
ments is what this refers to.7"
Several committee members, however, felt that the role of the Presi-
dent was not clearly delineated in the bill.76 To this end, the Com-
mittee reported an amendment to section 201(a)(4) deleting the
qualifying term "general" so that the section now authorized the
exercise of "such supervision . . .as may be appropriate." The
7' House Commerce Hearings, supra note 41, at 476 (Under Secretary of State McGhee).
71 Senate Commerce Hearings, supra note 44, at 121 (Commissioner Craven).
1, See, e.g., id. at 162-64 (Sen. Yarborough).
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Committee report stated that the word "general" was deleted be-
cause it suggested "restriction of the President's powers and respon-
sibilities with respect to the formation and execution of the foreign
policies of the United States."77
That this amendment was not intended to affect the compro-
mise between public and private responsibility effectuated by the
previous amendments to sections 201(a)(4) and 402 is evident from
the Commerce Committee's report:
Section 402 should be read with section 201(a)(4) as both are
concerned with the role of the corporation in relation to U.S.
foreign policy. . . . Section 402(a)(4) [sic] 78 . . .reaffirms the
traditional responsibility of the President, and through him of
the Department of State, for conducting foreign policy. Section
402, on the other hand, is concerned with the narrower problem
of the corporation's business negotiations with international or
foreign entities. With respect to these negotiations, the corpo-
ration is to notify the Department of State when entering into
negotiations and that Department is to advise the corporation
of relevant foreign policy considerations.79
The Committee's analysis suggests that the Executive branch was
barred from regulating Comsat's commercial dealings with foreign
agencies with respect to facilities, operations, or services. As stated
by Under Secretary of State McGhee:
Section 402 is limited to business negotiations, with respect to
facilities, operations or services. Negotiations of this character
are carried on by private firms in the normal course of business.
Any agreements, however, of a character which customarily
call for approval by the Executive or the Congress would, in our
opinion, continue to require that approval."
The amended bill passed the House on May 3, 1962,1 with only
minor opposition. However, the bill ran into serious trouble on the
Senate floor. Several senators picked up on the criticism voiced in
the minority report of the Senate Commerce Committee that the
S. REP. No. 1584, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 15, reprinted in [1962] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2269, 2277.
78 The Committee meant § 201(a)(4).
19 S. REP. No. 1584, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 23-24, reprinted in [1962] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2269, 2285.
" Letter from George C. McGhee, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, to
Senator Pastore (June 22, 1962), reprinted in 108 CONG. REC. 15152 (1962). The agreements
referred to would, of course, be executive agreements or treaties.
a' 108 CONG. REc. 7712-13 (1962). The vote was 354 to 9.
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bill delegated to a private monopoly the function of conducting
American foreign policy;"2 moreover, it was argued, the distinction
between the "political" and "business" aspects of the satellite sys-
tem was too elusive to be capable of application. 3 These problems,
among others,84 threatened to inspire a filibuster.85 The bill was
therefore referred to the Foreign Relations Committee for clarifica-
tion. 6
The Foreign Relations Committee heard testimony primarily
from Administration witnesses. FCC Chairman Newton Minow,
8 7
Attorney General Robert Kennedy,88 Secretary of State Dean
Rusk,"8 and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara'" all testified to
the effect that the bill did not delegate the foreign affairs power to
a private corporation. Secretary Rusk served as the principal
spokesman. Although Rusk disclaimed any interest in the State
Department's becoming officially involved with the technical and
commercial aspects of the satellite program,' he asserted that the
revision to section 201(a)(4) had restored the original effect of the
Administration's proposals and that the purpose of the amendments
to sections 201(a)(4) and 402 had been to tranfer to the President,
in whose hands it properly belonged, the substantive authority to
control the corporation's international affairs. 2
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported the bill fa-
vorably without amendments. In its report the Committee simply
summarized "the views of the executive branch with respect to the
question of the authority of the President" 3 by reproducing an ex-
change between Senator Sparkman and Secretary Rusk. In that
12 S. REP. No. 1584, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 53, reprinted in [19621 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 2269, 2311 (minority views of Senators Yarborough and Bartlett).
See, e.g., 108 CONG. REc. 15073 (Sen. Gore), 15155 (Sen. Kefauver).
Three other principal objections were raised: (1) that the bill effected a "giveaway"
by the government of a national asset; (2) that the corporation would be controlled by the
communications carriers, particularly AT&T; and (3) that the FCC could not be expected to
protect the public interest, given its past regulatory record. See 108 CONG. REC. 16918-22
(1962) (Sen. Pastore).
See 108 CONG. REc. 15187-88 (1962). See also id. at 16430-31 (Sen. Kefauver).
Id. The motion to recommit the bill was passed on August 1, 1962. The Foreign
Relations Committee was instructed to report the bill back within 10 days.
a Communications Satellite Act of 1962: Hearings before the Senate Comm. on Foreign
Relations, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 18-19, 64, 71, 90-91 (1962). [hereinafter cited as Senate
Foreign Relations Hearings.]
Id. at 34.
Id. at 178-80, 209-11.
Id. at 298.
" Id. at 174.
Id. at 175, 176, 178-79, 210-11.
S. REP. No. 1873, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in [1962] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2318, 2319.
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exchange Rusk indicated that the President would have authority
to decide what negotiations the government would conduct and
what negotiations concern business matters within the meaning of
section 402,14 that the President would conduct important negotia-
tions with foreign governments,95 and that the Executive branch
would conduct any negotiations leading to an Executive agreement
or a treaty.
Secretary Rusk's reassurances did not satisfy the bill's oppo-
nents. On the Senate floor the opponents again advanced the claim
that the bill delegated the foreign affairs power to a private corpora-
tion. 7 However, the bill's proponents successfully invoked the
recently-passed cloture rules,9" and the bill passed the Senate.9 De-
spite some differences between the House and Senate versions, the
bill did not go to conference; instead, the Senate version was intro-
duced directly onto the House floor. After limited debate, during
which House opponents repeated the "delegation of the foreign af-
fairs power" argument,' the bill passed the House.1"' President
Kennedy signed the bill shortly thereafter.
The effect of the proceedings in the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee upon the interpretation of the relationship between sec-
tions 201(a)(4) and 402 is unclear. On the one hand, Senator Pas-
tore, in the final speech before the Senate vote, approved the Rusk
interpretation and read a letter from the Secretary that repeated the
assertion that "the authority contained in the original section 402
was transferred to section 201(a) (4). 11102 On the other hand, Rusk's
assertion is plainly inconsistent with what appears to have been the
intention underlying the amendments to sections 201(a)(4) and 402
early in the legislative process."°3 The distinction drawn between
business and diplomatic aspects of satellite system development
becomes meaningless under the Rusk interpretation because the
Executive could control any Comsat foreign business activity
simply by deciding that it affects some foreign policy interest."4
Id. at 3, [1962] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2320.
Id. at 3, [1962] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2320.
Id. at 4, [1962] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2321.
" 108 CONG. REC. 16816-17 (1962).
"Id. at 16431.
" Id. at 16926.
'® Id. at 17674, 17677.
101 Id. at 17681. The vote was 372 to 10.
"' Id. at 16924.
' See text and notes at notes 36-74 supra.
"' And nearly anything might. See Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 636 n.108 (Wright,
J.), 701-03 (Wilkey, J., concurring and dissenting) (D.C. Cir. 1975).
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Moreover, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee did not ex-
pressly adopt Rusk's interpretation of the bill-it simply purported
to report the Administration's view.
To resolve this ambiguity it is useful to consider the context in
which Rusk's testimony was elicited. The concern which led to the
Foreign Relations "clarification" hearings was that the bill would
delegate foreign policy powers to a private corporation. The minor-
ity views of Senators Morse, Long, and Gore reported in the Foreign
Relations Committee Report articulate this concern. 5 The senators
claimed that section 402 gave the corporation the authority to deter-
mine for itself that a given negotiation was a "business negotia-
tion"'' 6 and thereby delegated to Comsat the power "to negotiate
agreements with foreign governments on matters affecting U.S. for-
eign policy," including the power to handle the anticipated negotia-
tions regarding the establishment of an international satellite sys-
tem.'
07
Viewed from this perspective Rusk's assertions are less per-
suasive authority. The congressmen were concerned that the bill
might delegate, perhaps unconstitutionally,"' the Executive power
over foreign diplomacy to a private corporation. However, one need
not assent to the proposition that the Executive has plenary author-
ity to intervene in Comsat's affairs simply upon a finding that those
affairs affect foreign policy in some way in order to read the statute
as leaving the Executive's power to conduct foreign relations undis-
turbed. Matters of diplomacy-matters affecting the rights, duties,
and interests of the United States as sovereign-are fundamentally
different in nature from matters concerning a corporation's interna-
tional business, even though such business matters may implicate
foreign policy interests. This distinction, as was suggested above,0 9
was recognized and incorporated into the bill by the House Com-
merce and Senate Space Sciences Committees and adopted by the
Senate Commerce Committee. The proceedings before the Foreign
Relations Committee cannot, consistently with that prior legislative
history, be viewed as reading the distinction out of the bill. Since it
is not necessary to do so in order to effectively assuage the concerns
that prompted, and in fact permeated, the Foreign Relations hear-
ings, Rusk's assertions before that Committee should be discounted.
W S. REP. No. 1873, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. Pt. ]I, reprinted in [1962] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 2321-27.
' Id. at 2324.
" Id. at 2325.
10 See, e.g, Senate Foreign Relations Hearings, supra note 87, at 372.
'" See text and notes at notes 65-75 supra.
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It is fair to conclude that preemptive Executive authority extends
only to matters of foreign relations'"-that is, that the Executive
can determine that a negotiation involves a foreign policy interest
such that the government will carry on the negotiation as a matter
of diplomacy-and that Executive branch control over business ne-
gotiations the Executive is unwilling to raise to a diplomatic level
is limited to the giving of advice under section 402.
B. Comsat, the Executive, and the FCC
The role accorded the FCC in the regulation of the corporation
also delimits the scope of Presidential supervisory power under sec-
tion 201(a)(4). Sections 201(c)"1  and 401112 of the Act vest in the
FCC primary regulatory authority over Comsat.113 Section 201(c)
110 In fact, at some points this appears to be the way the Administration spokesmen read
the bill:
MR. CHAYES [Legal Advisor, Department of State]: I would say generally if I may in
this connection that the President has constitutional authority in the field of foreign
relations, and to assert the foreign policy, to define it, to assert it and to represent the
Government of the United States in its foreign relations with other countries. So that
when the bill says that the President shall supervise the relationship of this entity with
foreign nations, entities, and international organizations, it means he shall use his con-
stitutional authority to conduct the foreign relations of the United States to do so.
Senate Foreign Relations Hearings, supra note 87, at 212. However, other statements by
Administration officials are inconsistent with this interpretation. See, e.g., Senate Foreign
Relations Hearings, supra note 87, at 178 (Secretary Rusk); 90-91 (Minow); 196, 212 (Chayes).
Particularly troublesome is the State Department's opinion that an amendment offered by
Senator Gore stating that "the corporation shall comply with the directives of the President"
need not be adopted, on the ground that it was unnecessary in light of the broad language of
section 201(a)(4). See id. at 433-34. Senator Gore, however, saw no such authority implicit
in the statute. Id. at 212-13. Moreover, it must be remembered that it is what the congressmen
thought the bill meant, not what the State Department thought, that is of primary import-
ance, and, as argued in the text, it was not necessary to adopt some of the broad propositions
asserted by State Department spokesmen in order to meet the objections of some senators,
objections that threatened to impede the bill's progress. The force of State Department
rejections of proposed amendments is further undercut by the Administration's anxiousness
that the bill pass quickly because of impending international negotiations. See 108 CONG.
REc. 16924 (1962) (Sen. Pastore). Perhaps a major reason underlying State's opposition to
the Gore and similar amendments was the fear that its inclusion might revive the concern
that had led to the amendment to section 402, thereby further delaying passage of the bill,
and the hope that the legislative history which had been "created" in the Foreign Relations
hearings would serve the same end.
MI 47 U.S.C. § 721(c) (1970).
,,2 Id. § 741 (1970).
"3 See generally Throop, Some Legal Aspects of Satellite Communication, 17 AM. U.L.
REv. 12, 20-22 (1967). It should be noted that FCC regulation comprehends the overall struc-
ture of the United States's international communications satellite service industry and not
merely the affairs of one corporation. See Satellite Act § 201, 47 U.S.C. § 721(c) (1970). In
practice, the Commission has structured the industry on the assumption that Comsat will
operate principally as a wholesaler of communications-"a carrier's carrier"--with the ulti-
mate users (except the United States government per § 201(a)(6) of the 1962 Act) procuring
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specifically authorizes the FCC, inter alia, to insure the technical
compatibility of the satellite facilities with existing facilities,' ap-
prove the technical characteristics of the satellite system,11 5 grant
appropriate authorizations for the construction of terminal sta-
tions, ' insure that no additions to the system are made unless
required by the public interest, convenience, and necessity,'17 and
require additions to the systems as may be required by the public
interest, convenience, and necessity." 8 The section also grants the
Commission power to determine the terms and conditions for utili-
zation of the satellite system, including commercial rates and serv-
ices."' Furthermore, it gives the agency far-reaching authority over
Comsat's management actions related to the corporation's financial
affairs.' 2'
The specific powers accorded the FCC in section 201(c) supple-
ment the agency's regulatory authority under section 401. That sec-
tion designates Comsat a common carrier subject to titles II and III
of the Communications Act of 1934,121 to the extent that the 1934
Act requirements are consistent with those of the 1962 Act. Sections
214 and 319 of the 1934 Act require carriers to obtain Commission
approval for the acquisition or construction of new lines of commu-
nications or the extension of existing lines, 2 and to secure a permit
from the FCC prior to the construction of any radio facility. 12 Thus,
Comsat must obtain FCC authorization before it can participate in
the establishment of new lines of communication between geo-
graphic points, 2 1 undertake the construction of a ground station, or
service directly only from authorized retail carriers. See Authorized Entities and Authorized
Users Under the Communications Satellite Act of 1962, 4 F.C.C.2d 421 (1966), modified 6
F.C.C.2d 593 (1967).
"I Satellite Act § 201(c)(4), 47 U.S.C. § 721(c)(4) (1970).
" Id. § 201(c)(6), 47 U.S.C. § 721(c)(6) (1970).
"' Id. § 201(c)(7), 47 U.S.C. § 721(c)(7) (1970).
"' Id. § 201(c)(9), 47 U.S.C. § 721(c)(9) (1970).
S Id. § 201(c)(10), 47 U.S.C. § 721(c)(10) (1970).
"1 Id. § 201(c)(2)(5), 47 U.S.C. § 721(c)(2)(5) (1970).
"2 See, e.g., id. § 201(c)(1), 47 U.S.C. § 721(c)(1), (8) (1970). This grant of authority was
viewed by Congress as necessary to prevent excessive capitalization or accumulation of dis-
proportionate amounts of debt or equity capital. See Legislation Note, 76 HARv. L. REV. 388,
390 n.11 (1962). In fact, the Commission has exerted a profound, though indirect, influence
over Comsat's capital structure through the ratemaking process. The FCC has recently held
that Comsat's authorized rate of return will be measured on the basis of an imputed
debt/equity ratio substantially greater than that which actually prevails. See In re Communi-
cations Satellite Corp., 56 F.C.C.2d 1101, 1157-60 (1975), remanded on other grounds, No.
75-2193 (D.C. Cir., Oct. 14, 1977).
121 47 U.S.C. §§ 201-223, 301-30 (1970).
in Id. § 214.
i Id. § 319.
22 See CoMPTRoLLER GENERAL's REPORT, supra note 30, at 10.
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participate in the construction of an INTELSAT facility.'1 In deter-
mining whether an authorization is in the public interest the FCC
considers factors beyond those peculiar to satellite services. The
Commission's policy is to license future facilities only after consid-
eration of the proper mix of satellite and conventional facilities.' 26
The breadth of FCC authority to regulate the financial affairs
of the corporation and the technical aspects of satellite system de-
velopment cannot be easily squared with a broad view of Executive
branch authority under section 201(a)(4). Recognition of Executive
authority to control Comsat's foreign business activities whenever
those activities affect foreign policy or the national interest would
necessarily imply Executive power to dictate FCC decisions or to
circumvent the FCC entirely.
So broad a reading of section 201(a) (4) would virtually neutral-
ize the explicit restrictions on executive authority over the FCC
found elsewhere in the Act. For example, section 201(a)(7) as pro-
posed provided that the President would "insure efficient fre-
quency use,"'' z7 thus perhaps implying executive authority to over-
see the FCC's allocation of commercial frequencies. 28 The Senate
Commerce Committee amended this section to its present form,'2 '
which authorizes the President only "to exercise his authority...
to help attain coordinated . . . use of the electromagnetic spec-
trum."13 ' The committee report explained: "The amendment will
make clear that no new authority is granted to the President to
accomplish these ends but that he will have to rely on his present
authority.' 3' The present authority referred to was apparently the
power to conduct diplomatic negotiations on international fre-
quency questions. The committee chairman explained: "Once we
decide on an international. . . level what frequencies can be used
by what country, the FCC shall then determine what use shall be
made of the frequencies which have been allocated to us."'' 32
Similarly, the one area of the Act which delineates with any
125 Id.
121 See Policy to be Followed in Future Licensing of Facilities for Overseas Communica-
tions, 30 F.C.C.2d 571 (1971). See also Further Statement of Policy, 62 F.C.C.2d 451 (1976).
127 S. 2814, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. § 201(a)(7) (1962), in Space Sciences Hearings, supra
note 41, at 6.
In See Senate Commerce Hearings, supra note 44, at 260. The Communications Act of
1934 gives the FCC authority to allocate commercial frequencies. 47 U.S.C. § 303(c) (1970).
" See S. REP. No. 1584, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 15, reprinted in [1962] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 2269, 2277.
,3o 47 U.S.C. § 721(a)(7) (1970).
,S1 5. REP. No. 1584, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 15, reprinted in [1962] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 2269, 2277.
6' 108 CONG. REC. 15073 (1962) (Sen. Pastore).
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particularity the respective roles of the FCC and the President re-
flects a rather narrow view of executive branch authority. Section
201(c)(3) provides that
in any case where the Secretary of State, after obtaining the
advice of ... [NASA] as to technical feasibility, has advised
that commercial communication to a particular foreign point
. . . should be established in the national interest, [the FCC
shall] institute forthwith appropriate proceedings under . . .
[47 U.S.C. § 214(d)(1970)] to require the establishment of
such communication by the corporation and the appropriate
common carriers .... 133
Under this provision, the Secretary of State does not have the power
to order Comsat to establish an overseas connection nor may he
dictate the terms of the FCC's order. Rather, the FCC is empowered
to define the terms and conditions of the order after a full hearing.'13
While the Secretary of State's determination of the national interest
justification for the issuance of the order will in all likelihood be
conclusive, the FCC does have the responsibility, under section
214(d) of the Communications Act of 1934, to determine whether
the extension of service will impair the ability of communications
companies to perform their duties to the public as common car-
riers. 35
Congressional amendments to other sections of the Act also
demonstrate an intention to cut down on the scope of Executive
authority. 36 These amendments were motivated in part by congres-
" Satellite Act § 201(c)(3), 47 U.S.C. § 721(c)(3) (1970).
' See House Commerce Hearings, supra note 41, at 459, 485-86, 490-91, 493-94, 503;
Senate Commerce Hearings, supra note 44, at 161. Senator Gore objected to the section on
this basis. 108 CONG. Rac. 15063-64 (1962).
1' 47 U.S.C. § 214(d) (1970).
"' Section 201(a)(1) of the Act, as originally proposed, would have authorized the Presi-
dent to "plan, develop, and supervise the execution of a national program for the establish-
ment.., of a... satellite system." S. 2814, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. § 201(a)(1) (1962), in Space
Sciences Hearings, supra note 41, at 6 (emphasis added). The section was amended to provide
that the President should "aid... and foster the execution of a national program." Satellite
Act § 201(a)(1), 47 U.S.C. § 721(a)(1) (1970) (emphasis added). See S. 2814, 87th Cong., 2d
Sess. § 403(a)(1) (1962), as amended by the Senate Comm. onAeronautical & Space Sciences,
reprinted in Senate Commerce Hearings, supra note 44, at 5. The Administration's bill had
proposed that articles of incorporation filed by the Presidential incorporators could be
"amended only upon the initiation by or by approval of the President." S. 2814, 87th Cong.,
2d Sess. § 302 (1962), as introduced, reprinted in Space Sciences Hearings, supra note 41, at
8. This proposal was deleted from the bill. Compare id. with S. 2814, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. §
405 (1962), as amended by the Senate Comm. on Aeronautical & Space Sciences, reprinted
in Senate Commerce Hearings, supra note 44, at 7. A 1969 revision of section 303 of the 1962
Act gave Comsat explicit authority to amend its corporate articles. Act of March 12, 1969,
Pub. L. No. 91-3, § 1, 53 Stat. 4 (1969).
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sional concern that the proposed bill unnecessarily duplicated regu-
latory efforts' 37 and, apparently, the belief that the FCC should have
primary responsibility for the regulation of the corporation. 38 Al-
though section 201(a)(3) of the Act directs the President to
"coordinate the activities of governmental agencies with responsi-
bilities in the field of telecommunication, so as to insure that there
is full and effective compliance at all times with the policies set
forth in this chapter,"'39 this "coordination" provision cannot be
read as granting the President the authority to circumvent the
FCC's jurisdiction, either by dictating FCC decisions or by exerting
direct control over Comsat.4 0 President Kennedy made it clear in
proposing the bill that it did not alter existing relationships among
agencies: "Adequate authority and responsibility is reserved for the
President to insure that the policies and objectives of the act are
carried out effectively. The draft legislation does not interfere with
or limit the existing prerogatives of any Government agency.""'
Along the same lines, FCC chairman Newton Minow testified that
section 201(c)(3) does not diminish any of the FCC's regulatory
powers. 42
The FCC's mandate is to decide questions arising within its
jurisdiction under the statutory criteria of public interest, conveni-
ence, and necessity. Although the President's view as to what would
most effectively carry out the policies of the Act will be relevant and
in some instances will be determinative'-especially on questions
The Senate also deleted from the original Administration bill for the 1962 Act a proposal
to allow the President to designate a Government official who would have access to Comsat's
files and authority to attend meetings of the corporation's board of directors. Compare S.
2814, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. § 201(a)(8) (1962), reprinted in Space Sciences Hearings, supra
note 41, at 7, with S. 2814, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. § 403(a) (1962), as amended by the Senate
Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, reprinted in Senate Commerce Hearings,
supra note 44, at 5-6.
"I See House Commerce Hearings, supra note 41, at 379, 385, 389-90, 430-32, 523-26, 558,
702-03; Space Sciences Hearings, supra note 306, at 178, 316, 394-95.
I's See, e.g., House Commerce Hearings, supra note 41, at 423; Space Sciences Hearings,
supra note 306, at 178.
,' Satellite Act § 201(c)(3), 47 U.S.C. § 721(c)( 3 ) (1970).
,, Indeed, the House rejected the amendment to section 201(a) offered by Representative
Celler that would have provided the President such power. See text and note at note 72 supra.
This amendment would have granted the President authority to review and approve all
actions taken by Comsat and all policies adopted by government agencies, including the FCC.
"' Letter from President Kennedy to Lyndon B. Johnson and John W. McCormack
(February 7, 1962) reprinted in [1962] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2288, 2290.
,12 House Commerce Hearings, supra note 41, at 429.
,, This has been the case in proceedings under § 201(a)(6) of the 1962 Act. Satellite Act
§ 201(a)(6), 47 U.S.C. § 721(a)(6) (1970). This section commands the President to "take all
necessary steps to insure the availability and appropriate utilization of the communications
satellite system for general governmental purposes except where a separate communications
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having foreign policy aspects-the decision is ultimately the Com-
mission's.44
C. Legislative Preemption
It is nearly indisputable that the President is, under the Consti-
tution, the "sole organ" of the United States in the conduct of
foreign relations, 5 in the sense that only he may communicate or
negotiate with foreign governments. The President asserts rights
and assumes duties for the United States and can make some inter-
national agreements solely on his own authority.'46 As these powers
are solely the President's,'47 they cannot be exercised by a private
person' or by the Congress. As noted earlier, section 201(a)(4) of
the 1962 Act recognized the Executive's foreign affairs power.'
The power to conduct diplomatic relations does not exhaust the
executive power over foreign affairs."' There are undoubtedly many
actions short of diplomatic negotiation which a President could jus-
tify through invocation of the foreign affairs power. This general
foreign affairs power encompasses an inherent presidential power to
take action designed to affect foreign commerce, at least in some
respects.'5 ' Recognition of the existence of the power, however, only
satellite system is required." Id. The FCC has ruled that Executive branch determinations
of the national interest in obtaining such service for national defense purposes will be conclu-
sive. Authorized Entities and Authorized Users, 6 F.C.C.2d 593, 594 (1967). The implications
of this decision are necessarily limited and the decision cannot be read as endorsing the notion
of paramount executive authority over regulatory matters arising under the 1962 Act.
" See COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 30, at 53-56.
I" See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936); L. HENKIN,
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTrru=oN 45-49, 92-94 (1972). The phrase "sole organ" was
coined by (later Chief Justice) John Marshall while a member of the House. 10 ANNALS OF
CONG. 613 (1800). The constitutional basis for authority of the President to make executive
agreements has been found in several provisions. See RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW [hereinafter cited as I1STATEMENT (SEcOND)], § 121, comment a (1965).
' See L. HENKIN, supra note 145 at 48. Treaties, of course, require Senate consent. U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.2. The permissible scope of international agreements is limited only by
the requirement that their subject matter be of "international concern"-that is, "relate to
the external concerns of the nation as distinguished from matters of a purely internal nature."
See RESTATEMFNT (SECOND), supra note 145, § 117, comment b.
1"7 See L. HENKIN, supra note 145, at 92-94. But some international agreements may be
made only with congressional authorization, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 145, §
120.
1, Cf. United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 556-59 (1975). In Mazurie the Court
acknowledged the principle that Congress may not delegate the legislative power to nongov-
ernmental agencies. It held that a delegation of the authority of Congress to govern the Indian
tribes, U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8(d)(3), to a tribal council was permissible only because the
council possessed "attributes of sovereignty."
"5 See text and notes at notes 73-79 supra.
" See L. HENKIN, supra note 145, at 48-49.
"' See Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. Kissinger, 506 F.2d 136, 148 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
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"opens the door to analysis,111 2 for the power to regulate foreign
commerce is expressly committed to Congress.153 When Congress
legislates comprehensively in an area pursuant to its article I foreign
commerce power, that legislation preempts the field, and the Presi-
dent may not take any action in the area except as authorized by
the legislation.' 54
In the two major cases involving the preemption doctrine, the
Supreme Court has given it a wide scope. In the case of Little v.
Barreme,'s Chief Justice Marshall held that the President did not
have authority to order the seizure of a vessel sailing from a French
port because Congress had enacted legislation which authorized
only the seizure of vesssels bound to France. Similarly, in the Steel
Seizure case"' four of the six members of the Supreme Court major-
ity applied the preemption doctrine to hold that the executive was
without authority to seize and operate steel mills in the interests of
the Korean War effort.1 57
These cases clearly indicate that the President cannot rely on
"some aura of 'inherent' Presidential authority""' 8 to legitimate ac-
(Leventhal, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1004 (1975).
15 The phrase is Judge Leventhal's. See Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. Kissinger, 506
F.2d 136, 148 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1004 (1975).
' U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
,' Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. Kissinger, 506 F.2d 136, 142-43 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 1004 (1975); United States v. Yoshida Int'l, Inc., 526 F.2d 560 (C.C.P.A.
1975). See Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804).
's 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804).
01 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
,01 The four justices were Frankfurter, Clark, Jackson, and Burton. Justice Frankfurter
left open the question whether the President's actions would be proper in the absence of
legislation bearing upon the asserted presidential authority. He concluded that the enact-
ments of the Taft-Hartley Act and the Defense Production Act of 1950 were intended to deny
such authority. Id. at 597-614. Justice Clark's opinion rested squarely on Little v. Barreme,
6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804), and held that it was incumbent on the President to follow the
procedures established by the Selective Service Act, as well as the Taft-Hartley and Defense
Production Acts, in order to effect the seizure. Id. at 663-65. Justice Jackson noted that the
seizure of private property was not an open field, but had been covered by three statutory
policies inconsistent with the President's action. Id. at 639. Finally, Justice Burton stated
that the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act meant that Congress had authorized a procedure
that the President had failed to follow. Id. at 659. The other members of the majority, Justices
Black and Douglas, took a broader view of congressional authority, reasoning that the power
to seize property was wholly committed to the legislature. Id. at 582-90 (Black, J.); id. at 629-
34 (Douglas, J.).
01 The phrase is Judge Leventhal's. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. Kissinger, 506 F.2d
136, 149 (D.C.Cir. 1974) (dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1004 (1975). See United
States v. Western Union Tel. Co., 272 F. 311 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 272 F. 893 (2d Cir. 1921), rev'd
on consent of the parties, 260 U.S. 754 (1922). Western Union held that in the absence of
statutory authorization, the President could not impose conditions upon the landing in Amer-
ican territory of international cables owned by a domestic company which, like Comsat,
operated under a federal franchise. The court stated: "It is not sufficient to say that he must
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tions taken outside a comprehensive Congressional scheme of for-
eign commerce regulation. The recent case of Consumers Union of
U.S., Inc. v. Kissinger'59 confirms the point. In that case the District
of Columbia Circuit upheld Presidential negotiation, pursuant to
his foreign affairs powers, of voluntary limits on steel imports by
foreign steel producers, but based its holding, in part, on the ground
that Congress had not preempted the field with respect to such
voluntary agreements. 60 The President could negotiate an
enforceable agreement, the court noted, only pursuant to the proce-
dures and under the circumstances spelled out by the Trade Expan-
sion Act of 1962.61
The preemption doctrine is applicable to the field of interna-
tional satellite communication. Acting pursuant to its power to reg-
ulate foreign commerce Congress in the 1962 Act prescribed a com-
prehensive structure to govern American participation in the global
satellite system. It chose to create a private corporation and to rely
in part on business incentives to accomplish its statutory objectives.
The primary regulatory authority was vested in the FCC. Moreover,
Congress recognized the essential role of the President in the con-
duct of foreign relations through the inclusion of section 201(a)(4).
Any exercise of Presidential or Executive power not authorized by
the 1962 Act should therefore be precluded. This is especially true
with respect to Executive actions inconsistent with the restriction
of Executive authority over Comsat's business negotiations under
section 402 or in conflict with the regulatory role entrusted to the
FCC by sections 201(c) and 401.
III. THE LEGALITY OF CURRENT EXECUTIVE BRANCH SUPERVISION
The foregoing discussion of the limits of Executive authority
over Comsat has important implications. This section of the com-
ment will apply that analysis to the three principal means whereby
the Executive currently exercises supervisory authority.
The first means, negotiation with foreign governments of inter-
national agreements regarding satellite systems, 2 is clearly a per-
missible exercise of Executive authority. Comsat and the State De-
partment, however, have differed over what role each should play
in the negotiation of INTELSAT agreements. During the initial
have this authority.., because the United States is a sovereign nation and must be deemed
to have all customary national powers." 272 F. at 313.
506 F.2d 136 (D.C.Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1004 (1975).
11 Id. at 143.
I" Id.
112 See text and notes at notes 9-17 supra.
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negotiations leading to the interim agreement, Comsat regarded the
State Department's involvement as an unwarranted intrusion into
the corporation's affairs."'3 The State Department prevailed, and
the basic decisions regarding the establishment of the satellite sys-
tem were resolved through diplomatic channels."4 The course of
events respecting the negotiation of the interim arrangements in
1969 followed a similar pattern: Comsat wanted to maintain the
interim consortium"5 but the State Department, sensitive to foreign
political pressures for a new organization, preempted Comsat and
the negotiations were conducted through a plenipotentiary confer-
ence. 6' State's actions appear to be a proper exercise of Executive
authority under section 201(a)(5) of the Act, which authorizes the
President to insure timely arrangements for foreign participation in
the satellite system;"7 the resulting agreements, moreover, were
Executive agreements binding on the United States as well as Com-
sat, and therefore State Department intervention was a proper exer-
cise of Presidential supervisory authority under section 201(a)(4).
This mode of Executive supervision may also be available to
prevent Comsat from pursuing certain activities within INTEL-
SAT. For example, in late 1972 Comsat proposed that INTELSAT
provide a maritime service capability in future systems.'66 In re-
sponse, the British suggested that although INTELSAT might pro-
vide such service under contract to third parties, the treatment of
the complex questions concerning planning, financing, implement-
ing, and operating a global maritime system might require the es-
tablishment of a new international organization.' 9 The United
States acquiesced in this position and, after consulting Comsat,
participated in discussions under the auspices of the United Nations
Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization, Compre-
hensive agreements were ultimately concluded establishing a new
international organization, the International Maritime Satellite
Organization [INMARSAT], with responsibility for maritime serv-
ice.,70
'6 See J. GALLOWAY, THE POLITICS AND TECHNOLOGY OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS 81-83
(1972); D. SMITH, COMMUNICATION VIA SATELLITE 131-32 (1976).
164 See text and notes at notes 9-17 supra.
I's See Johnsen, Comsat, State Dept. Split on Negotiations, Av. WEEK AND SPACE TECH.,
March 31, 1969, at 24.
'" See text and notes at notes 17-18 supra.
"' Satellite Act § 201(a)(5), 47 U.S.C. § 721(a)(5) (1970).
',' See Levy, supra note 16, at 676-80.
66, Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization Panel of Experts on Mari-
time Satellites, "Comments on Some Possible Institutional Arrangements for an Interna-
tional Maritime Satellite Service," Document 33, Extraordinary Session, Nov. 6-10, 1972
(United Kingdom contribution) (on file with The University of Chicago Law Review).
"7o INMARSAT Convention and Operating Agreement (London 1976). Legislation is cur-
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The second form of Executive supervisory authority over Com-
sat involves its participation in the INTELSAT Assembly of Par-
ties. Since the Assembly considers decisions of interest to sovereign
states as such, 171 it seems appropriate for representatives of the
State Department, rather than of Comsat, to act within this forum.
The mandate of section 201(a) (4) of the 1962 Act, that the Executive
branch may employ any measures appropriate to assert the sover-
eign interests of the nation, provides ample justification: the mem-
bers of the Assembly are the sovereign nations party to the INTEL-
SAT Definitive Agreement and the Assembly's jurisdiction extends
only to diplomatic issues. When the Assembly acts on matters out-
side its authority-for example, by passing resolutions concerning
INTELSAT operations-its views are not binding on the Board of
Governors, which is required only to give them due consideration. 72
There is serious question, however, about the third mode of
supervision adopted by the Executive-the practice of instructing
Comsat on the positions it should take on matters coming before the
INTELSAT Board of Governors. 173 One such instruction, issued in
September, 1976, required Comsat to urge the Board of Governors
to develop operational plans for the forthcoming INTELSAT V se-
ries of satellites.7 4 This instruction was ostensibly prompted by the
concern that the proposals then before the Board failed to ensure
efficient utilization of space satellite facilities.7 5 Possibly the State
Department was also apprehensive that the Board would approve
economically wasteful plans or plans that would so occupy the spec-
trum of available frequencies and orbital space that any other sys-
tems, established apart from INTELSAT, would be unable to oper-
ate efficiently. Another instruction expressed the stance Comsat
should take concerning the orbital positioning of a particular satel-
lite in the INTELSAT III series.77 This directive was motivated by
the Department of State's desire to assure spare satellite capacity
rently in draft that would permit U.S. participation in the new organization. Office of Tele-
communications Policy Press Release, February 20, 1976. See also Telecommunications
Reports 27-30, Sept. 19, 1977.
7 See text at note 26 supra.
" See INTELSAT Definitive Agreement, supra note 8, Art. X(b)(i), [1972] 23 U.S.T.
at 3845, T.I.A.S. No. 7532, - U.N.T.S. _.
"7 See text and notes at notes 30-34 supra.
" Letter from Gordon Huffcutt, Acting Director, Office of International Communica-
tions Policy, U.S. Department of State, to Richard R. Colino, Assistant Vice President,
International Relations and Planning, Comsat (September 7, 1976).
17 Id.
"' Official Report of Proceedings, Vol. 68, at 5748-5749 (Nov. 20, 1972), In re Application
of the Communications Satellite Corporation, 56 F.C.C.2d 1101 (1975), remanded, No. 75-
2193 (D.C. Cir., Oct. 14, 1977).
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for both Indian and Pacific Ocean regions.'77
Notwithstanding the important policy concerns underlying the
instructions, it is doubtful that they have binding legal effect.7 8
Since the Executive has no inherent consitutional power to direct
the international affairs of the corporation, 7' authority for the in-
struction procedure must be found in the statute. The Department
of State has justified its supervision of Comsat's Board of Gover-
nors' activities in part on the ground that section 201(a) of the 1962
Act vests in the President or his delegate18 the authority to deter-
mine the "national interest" with respect to the establishment and
operation of the satellite system, and that this authority subsumes
whatever public interest determinations may be within the juris-
diction of the FCC.'8 ' This reading of the statute is flawed in two
respects.
First, it ignores the primacy of the FCC in determining the
demands of public interest. The responsibility for the issuance of
regulatory orders pertaining to Comsat's operations is vested in the
FCC. Indeed, certain of the issues raised by the instructions de-
scribed above have been the subject of FCC proceedings.1 2 As the
Commission has maintained, foreign policy interests are only one
component of the public interest standard under which requests for
authorizations for participation in the ownership and operation of
INTELSAT facilities are determined.' 3 That particular instruc-
tions of a regulatory nature have not brought the State Department
into direct conflict with the FCC is beside the point; under the Act
the regulatory jurisdiction is the Commission's alone.
Second, the State Department reads too much into section
,71 Interview with J.S. Hannon, General Attorney, Communications Satellite Corpora-
tion, in Washington, D.C. (September 15, 1977).
" Enforcement of the instructions presumably would be accomplished pursuant to sec-
tion 403(a) of the Act, which authorizes the Attorney General to sue for equitable relief "[if]
the corporation ... shall engage in or adhere to any action, practices, or policies inconsistent
with the policy and purposes declared in section 701 of this title." Satellite Act § 403(a), 47
U.S.C. § 743(a) (1970).
Although the merits of a foreign policy decision may be nonjusticiable, questions of the
authority of the Executive to take certain actions in the foreign relations area are certainly
susceptible to judicial treatment. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962) (dictum); cf.
Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958) (inquiry into Secretary of State's authority to deny
passport applications).
VI With respect to the President's inherent authority over foreign affairs, the 1962 Act
preempted the field. See text and notes at notes 145-161 supra.
-M The President has delegated his authority under § 201(a)(4) of the 1962 Act, 47 U.S.C.
§ 721(a)(4) (1970), to the Department of State. See Executive Order 1119, 3 C.F.R. 273 (1964-
1965 Compilation).
"' See COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 30, at 54.
" See, e.g., In re Communications Satellite Corp., 44 F.C.C.2d 726, 729-30 (1973) (ad-
monishing Comsat to plan for efficient facilities utilization).
I" See COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 30, at 53-56.
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201(a)(4). Quite apart from the character of the instructions given,
implementation of the instructions procedure seems to be outside
the scope of the Executive's authority under section 201(a). The
President's authority under section 201(a)(4) to supervise the corpo-
ration in its international dealings is significantly limited. Execu-
tive branch control over business negotiations that the Executive
branch is unwilling to raise to a diplomatic level is restricted by
section 402 to the giving of advice.'84 It is arguable that the INTEL-
SAT agreements, by making separate provision for the Assembly of
Parties, effect a clear functional separation of political and business
matters within INTELSAT, and therefore that Comsat's activities
on the Board of Governors constitute business negotiations within
the meaning of section 402 of the 1962 Act. 8 5 Indeed, the matters
committed to the Board under the INTELSAT agreements are mat-
ters of management policy with regard to INTELSAT's operations,
facilities, and services, 181-the very matters specified in section 402
respecting which the State Department can only advise Comsat.
Although it could perhaps be argued that Comsat's activities on the
INTELSAT Board of Governors are not the type of "business nego-
tiations" which section 402 concerns, and do not involve the kind
of matters the Executive could or would negotiate over at a diplo-
matic level, such an argument proves too much. The legislative
11 See text and notes at notes 109-110 supra.
21 It is worthwhile to note that although the United States was-originally opposed to the
creation of the Assembly, its opposition was not prompted by the belief that the establish-
ment of the Assembly of Parties separated artificially the political from the business aspects
of the organization; rather, American opposition was due to apprehension that adoption of
the proposal would result in the unnecessary introduction of "political" issues into an organi-
zation that was primarily concerned with "matters of the design and development of the
system." See Plenipotentiary Conference on Definitive Arrangements for the International
Telecommunications Satellite Consortium, Document No. Com. 1161 (March 10, 1969) (state-
ment of the United States Representative to Committee I) (on file with The University of
Chicago Law Review). The U.S. Negotiator argued:
[W]e do not see this organization as having a continuing series of political questions to
deal with .... [I]t is our most sincere desire that this organization provide a service
which, like the scales of justice, is blind; [that] seeks to provide a service that everyone
needs, free of the political considerations that are such a heavy burden on so many of
our other international organizations.
Id. at 2. This perception of the character of INTELSAT makes it difficult to claim that
ordinary Board business requires diplomatic attention and executive supervision pursuant to
section 201(a)(4).
I" See generally INTELSAT Definitive Agreement, supra note 8, Art. X [1972] 23
U.S.T. at 3840-45, T.I.A.S. No. 7532, - U.N.T.S. -. Furthermore, this separation of
the "political" from the "business" aspects of INTELSAT's functions is carried out in prac-
tice. When the Assembly made the political determination to admit the Peoples' Republic of
China (Peking) and expel the Republic of China (Taipei), for example, the Board of Gover-
nors' sole responsibility was to work out the financial adjustments incident to the latter's
departure. See INTELSAT Assembly of Parties, Record of Decisions, AP-2-3E (1976).
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history reveals that the purpose of section 201(a)(4) was to insure
that the Act did not place truly major foreign policy decisions in the
hands of a private corporation. It was never seriously contemplated
that technical details of a business nature should be within the
province of the Executive.1 17 Indeed, the spectre of detailed State
Department supervision of Comsat affairs was one of the features
of the original Administration bill which its opponents found most
objectionable.""
Thus, by instructing Comsat on the positions it should take on
INTELSAT business matters, the State Department assumes res-
ponsibilities which Congress entrusted to the corporation and the
FCC, and the instructions issued therefore have no binding legal
effect.'89
181 An amendment proposed by Representative Celler that would have empowered the
Executive to "disapprove all acts or actions" of the corporation was defeated by a voice vote.
108 CONG. REC. 7709 (1962).
The truly radical nature of the State Department's assertion of authority is brought out
by an exchange between Senator Gore and the State Department's legal advisor, Abram
Chayes, which occurred during the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearings after
Chayes asserted a plenary presidential power to direct the corporation:
Senator GORE. I concur in your view that the President has constitutional responsi-
bility with respect to our Nation's foreign policy, but I challenge any assumption that
he has constitutional responsibility or authority for telling a private corporation what
to do-giving it directions as to what agreements it shall enter-unless the law so pro-
vides. The Constitution makes no such reference.
Mr. CHAYES. We believe this law does provide it in 201(a)(4), sir.
Senator GORE. Do you really believe that?
Mr. CHAYES. Yes, sir, I do.
Senator GORE. Would you cite any provision in this bill which confers any author-
ity upon the President which he does not Already have?
Mr. CHAYES. I think it is 201(a)(4).
Senator GORE. Does it say he shall do so-and-so?
Mr. CHAYES. Yes. It says he shall use his powers as President to conduct the foreign
policy of the United States to insure that this happens.
Senator GORE. Does it say he shall supervise and direct the actions of this private
corporation which is authorized to be chartered under the District of Columbia for
profit?
Mr. CHAYES. It is authorized to be chartered within the framework of this statute,
which provides an authorization to the President to act in this way.
Senator GORE. If what you say is correct, which I challenge, then there should be
no objection to making it explicit in the bill.
Mr. CHAYES. Well, it depends-
Senator GORE. If the administration contends it is thus, then what harm is there
to flow from making it explicit?
Mr. CHAYES. I would say there is no harm in making it explicit within the frame-
work of the limitations laid down in the Secretary's statement. The Secretary's state-
ment contains some limitations.
Senator GORE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senate Foreign Relations Hearings, supra note 87, at 212-13. The authorization was never
made "explicit" in the statute.
' See text and notes at notes 50-56 supra.
'9 The Executive has also justified the instruction procedure on grounds of need for
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CONCLUSION
The 1962 Act attempts to protect the public's interest in an
activity in which political and commercial interests are interrelated.
The Executive branch has broad authority to ensure that the com-
mercial satellite program is managed consistently with U.S. foreign
policy. However, the means for the execution of this authority are
limited by Congress's reliance upon business judgment for the ac-
complishment of the statutory objectives and by the regulatory role
which it assigned to the FCC. The Executive branch is free to decide
that a given issue involves fundamental interests of the United
States in foreign affairs and thereby to raise the issue to the level
of diplomacy. The State Department may then assume responsibil-
ity for negotiations carried out on behalf of the United States, and
may supervise Comsat accordingly. When foreign policy questions
arise in the context of Comsat's business activity, however, the
State Department can provide only guidance and advice. The FCC
alone has the authority to issue regulatory orders concerning Com-
sat's operations. Current Executive branch instruction procedures
are overly broad to the extent that they claim to result in legally
binding directives.
Steven A. Levy
policy coordination. See COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 30, at 54-56. The possi-
bility does exist that activities supported by Comsat within INTELSAT might be disap-
proved by the FCC when Comsat seeks regulatory approval. See In re Communications
Satellite Corp., 4 F.C.C.2d 8, 10-11 (1966) (concurring statement of Comm'r Cox); REPORT
OF THE TWENTETH CENTURY FUND, COMMUNICATING BY SATELLITE 40-41 (1969). The President's
authority to effect intergovernmental policy coordination under section 201(a)(3), however,
does not permit him to circumvent the FCC. See text and notes at notes 139-141 supra.
Moreover, the FCC has recognized that considerations of international comity compel it to
discharge its regulatory responsibilities without disrupting INTELSAT programs, see, e.g.,
Amendment of Part 25 of the Commission's Rules, 4 F.C.C.2d 251 (1966); Communications
Satellite Corp., 4 F.C.C.2d 8, 10-11 (1966) (concurring statement of Comm'r Cox); and has
adopted procedures requiring Comsat to obtain FCC approval before it commits itself to
specific programs. See Statement of Policy, 46 F.C.C.2d 338 (1974); COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S
REPoRT, supra note 30, at 55-56.
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